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The Irony and the Tragedy of Negotiated Space: 
A Case Study on Narrative Form and Aboriginal-
Government Relations during the Second World
War
P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER
Hayden White has stressed that all histories can be understood through theirnarrative forms.  Using his categorization, Tragedy is the dominant plot
structure employed in the historiography on Native-Newcomer relations.
Mechanistic and reductionist in its treatment of the structure of relationships,
White explains that “in Tragedy, there are no festive occasions, except false or
illusionary ones” and any “reconciliations that occur at the end of the Tragedy
… are more in the nature of resignations of men to the conditions under which
they must labor in the world.”1 For historians of Native-Newcomer relations
who adopt this mode of emplotment, the protagonists are defined along “racial”
lines: Aboriginal peoples on the one hand, and the “Euro-Canadian” (non-
Aboriginal) camp on the other.  This binary structure is conducive to asserting
sympathetic claims for Native groups seeking recompense for the dismal lega-
cies of colonialism, and the immediate need for a new (or a return to the old)
structure of Native-Newcomer relations.  This tendency to distil history “into
the simple narrative structure of a protagonist’s conflict with and eventual tri-
umph over opposing forces,” anthropologist Elizabeth Furniss has observed,
can create an inflexible Indian/White dichotomy that “renders invisible the
complexity of historical interactions and the diversity of social groups, … the
diverse and conflicting interests, and the ambiguities and incompleteness of
domination and resistance that characterized the colonial encounter.”2
1 Hayden White, Metahistory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 9.
2 Elizabeth Furniss, The Burden of History: Colonialism and the Frontier Myth in a Rural
Canadian Community (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999), 18. See also Sherry B. Ortner,
“Resistance and Ethnographic Refusal,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 37/1
(1995), 173-93.  For examples of this criticism, see Ann Carlos, review of Dianne Newell’s
Tangled Webs of History in Journal of Economic History 54/4 (December 1994), 966-68;
Douglas Cole’s review of Tangled Webs of History in American Historical Review 100/3 (June
1995), 978-9.
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An “official” embodiment of this binary narrative of the relationship can
be found in the massive final report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples (RCAP).  The opening volume, Looking Forward, Looking Back, is
a quintessential example of the history of modern Native-Newcomer relations
as Tragedy, with the potential for a Romantic outcome – a drama of redemp-
tion, “the hero’s transcendence of the world of experience, his victory over it,
and his final liberation from it”3 – should the government implement the
commission’s sweeping recommendations.  The structure is revealing.  The
opening sequence paints an idyllic, Eden-esque existence in pre-contact
North America where Aboriginal societies “flourished and grew” in wealth
and harmony.  The early nation-to-nation relations with non-Aboriginal new-
comers were rooted in co-operative exchanges and alliance systems.  By the
nineteenth century, the narrative continued, respect was replaced by non-
Aboriginal domination.  Aboriginal peoples’ loyalty to the Crown did not
diminish, but reciprocal fiduciary obligations were simply cast aside and the
doctrine of assimilation overwhelmed all else.  An emerging “Renewal and
renegotiation” phase following the infamous 1969 White Paper affirmed the
need to profoundly restructure the relationship.  This narrative is critical to
the political recommendations made by the RCAP for Aboriginal self-gover-
nance and government restitution for ongoing duplicity and attempted
cultural genocide.4
An entire chapter of the RCAP final report is devoted to Aboriginal peo-
ples’ loyal contributions to the war efforts of the twentieth century, and the
government’s refusal to treat these communities and their veterans properly.
This victimization, the narrative explains, was also perpetuated through the
coercive seizure of reserve lands for military use.  The dramatic appropriation
of the Stoney Point Reserve to create Camp Ipperwash in 1942 is the centre-
piece of the RCAP’s case, but it is suggested to the reader that this injustice was
not unique:
The term ‘land given up,’ which became part of the parlance of the IAB
[Indian Affairs Branch] at the time, obscures the amount of negotiating and the
pressure to comply that characterized land surrenders for military use.  In
many cases, even a lease was opposed by the band council involved. At Six
3 White, Metahistory, 8.  White explains the interrelationship between Romance and Tragedy:
“Comedy and Tragedy represent qualifications of the Romantic apprehension of the world,
…the former eventuates in a vision of the ultimate reconciliation of opposed forces and the
latter in a revelation of the forces opposing man on the other.  And it is possible for the
Romantic writer to assimilate the truths of human existence revealed in Comedy and Tragedy
respectively within the structure of the drama of redemption which he figures in his vision of
the ultimate victory of man over the world of experience.”  Ibid, 10.
4 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP), Final Report v. 1: Looking Forward,
Looking Back (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1996).
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Nations, for instance, there was a great deal of opposition to the lease of land
for a practice bombing range.5
According to the Royal Commission, these reserve lands were taken with the
“compliance of the IAB, the very agency charged with protecting Indian land.”6
In her studies of Indian agents in Ontario, historian Robin Brownlie con-
ceptualized local government relationships on reserves as “power contests”
between IAB field officials and their “Native clients.”  Agents prioritized
“maintaining authority and control,” she concluded, and in core matters over
lands and resources they were “unbending in their application of federal policy.”
Any Indians who questioned government plans were “branded as troublemak-
ers and subversives.”7 She also observed that agent John Daly’s “methods
conformed well to the style of administration encouraged by the Department”
and that as “a confirmed paternalist, he offered some protection to vulnerable
individuals while opposing those who strove to assert self-determination.”8
Drawing upon Noel Dyck’s suggestion that “tutelage agents” needed to exer-
cise departmental power to constrain Aboriginal agendas and control, she noted
that Indian agents “were cast in a role in which they would arbitrarily and self-
consciously exercise power over other human beings for no good reason.”  In
its “very nature,” Brownlie explained, the agents’ position “compelled them to
quell any aboriginal attempts at political self-assertion.”  She also generalized
that some of Daly’s behaviour was shared with “his fellow agents,” and in par-
ticular that their “political agenda was shaped by their personal interest in
maintaining Departmental control over the reserves.”9
The following narrative examines, in detail, the local power contest at Six
Nations that the RCAP cited in passing.  Rather than simply confirming the gen-
eral thrust of the historiography in Native-Newcomer relations that reinforces a
teleology of unbroken oppression and dispossession, this version of the story
reveals a more complex situation than the pithy RCAP statement allows.  In an
era that stresses a plurality of voices of perspectives and multi-centric histories, it
5 RCAP, Looking Forward, Looking Back, 584.  There is no citation provided in the report for
the Six Nations range negotiations.  On Ipperwash, see P.W. Lackenbauer, “Combined
Operation: The Appropriation of Stoney Point Reserve and the Creation of Camp Ipperwash,”
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 1/1 (Fall 1999), online publication.
6 RCAP, Looking Forward, Looking Back, 556, 590. 
7 Robin Brownlie, “A Fatherly Eye: Two Indian Agents on Georgian Bay, 1918-1939” (Ph.D.
diss., University of Toronto, 1996), 20, 447-8. See also A Fatherly Eye: Indian Agents,
Government Power, and Aboriginal Resistance in Ontario, 1918-1939 (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
8 Brownlie, “Man on the Spot: John Daly, Indian Agent in Parry Sound, 1922-1939,” Journal of
the Canadian Historical Association 5 (1994), 63.
9 Noel Dyck, What Is the Indian ‘Problem’: Tutelage and Resistance in Canadian Indian
Administration (St. John’s: Institute for Social and Economic Research, 1991), 77; Brownlie,
“Man on the Spot,” 85-6.
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questions whether the dominant emplotment of Tragedy used to narrate Native-
Newcomer relationships is too constraining to accommodate the diversity of
historical relationships and experiences.  Does a pre-figuration of the field along
Tragic lines preclude the inclusion of events and voices, apparent in the record,
that encourage a more Ironic emplotment?  In seeking to elucidate “the reality of
oppression” and create “more inclusive, and more authentic, narratives,” as
Veronica Strong-Boag suggested, does a fixation on Tragic “victim-survivor” sto-
ries better equip us to “characterize the reality of the past,” address “pressing
questions,” and create “meaningful memory for all Canadians?”10
* * *
The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP) would represent
Canada’s primary contribution to a “limited liability” war effort, William Lyon
Mackenzie King decided in December 1939.  Although his government had
repeatedly rejected British overtures to create an imperial air training program
in Canada during the late 1930s, the onset of another major European conflict
made it considerably more attractive politically.  If the nation channelled its
main energies into training Commonwealth pilots in its domestic airspace, con-
scription for overseas service would not be necessary.  Furthermore, if air
power theorists were correct, Allied strategic bombing might win the war with-
out intensive ground operations.  Few Canadians could be offended by the plan
so long as the costs were manageable.11
Canada was poorly prepared for war, and the federal government’s commit-
ment to carry out an extensive BCATP required intensive preparations.  The Royal
Canadian Air Force (RCAF) had only five aerodromes when war was declared,
with six more under construction.  The original training plan called for sixty-four
flying training schools, which obviously required a massive land acquisition and
building program.  The scale was well beyond the RCAF’s limited resources, so
the Department of National Defence (DND) drew upon the expert assistance of
other federal departments.  Civilians with the Department of Transport (DoT)12
10 Veronica Strong-Boag, “Contested Space: The Politics of Canadian Memory,” Journal of the
Canadian Historical Association 5 (1994), 3-16.
11 W.A.B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force: The Official History of the Royal
Canadian Air Force v. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 191-219; Norman
Hillmer, “Vincent Massey and the Origins of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan,”
Canadian Defence Quarterly (Spring 1987), 49-55.
12 In early 1940, Cabinet placed the responsibility for acquiring and developing BCATP aero-
dromes with the Department of Transport (DoT), who had overseen the expansion of Canadian
civil aviation during the interwar years.  The Lands Branch at Transport, which itself was not
equipped to acquire all of the properties required, arranged with the Real Estate Legal and
Land Surveys Department of Canadian National Railways to acquire lands after surveys were
complete and the lands selected.  DoT, “The Selection and Development of Airports for the
British Commonwealth Joint Air Training Plan by the Department of Transport,” 26-7,
Department of National Defence, Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH) 80/395.
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defined the selection process to secure lands for air bases, ranges, and landing
fields.  Modern, “scientific” measures would ensure that political lobbying and
patronage did not impede or influence the acquisition of optimum locations.  A set
of explicit, objective criteria ensured that the “aerodrome of democracy” would be
free of unnecessary hazards, built with efficiency, and completed as cheaply and
quickly as possible.13
As the BCATP began to take off in late 1939, Brantford civic leaders com-
mitted to assist the war effort in every possible way.  “Canada has accepted its
share of responsibility for the efficient conduct of the war and the achievement
of ultimate victory,” the editor of the Brantford Expositor wrote on 3 September
1939. “There is no division of opinion among Canadians in regard to the jus-
tice of the British cause, and as a united people Canada is prepared to extend
its maximum effort.”14 That night, under the monument to Joseph Brant in
Victoria Park, Major R.J. Waterous – who had commanded the local 54th
Battery before he was elected Mayor of Brantford in 1938 – gave a resounding
speech to more than “four thousand loyal Canadian of this City,” pledging “that
come what will, we shall do our duty in the defense of freedom and justice.”15
In the months ahead, Brantford residents learned that the air war would be piv-
otal and the “Empire Air Training Scheme” devised in Ottawa would be a major
contribution.  Not only would it bring material benefits to Canadians – a sig-
nificance not lost on a mayor and a city preoccupied with civic financing and
balanced budgets – but it would also reinforce the “solidarity of the Empire.”16
Unlike many Canadian communities, Brantford did not lobby for an air base17
– it had no need.  It boasted a modern airport, unveiled less than ten years ear-
lier by civil aviation authorities, and on 7 November RCAF officers came
13 J.A. Wilson, “Aerodrome Construction for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan
1940,” in Development of Aviation in Canada 1879-1948, 27, DHH 75/114; Rachel L. Heide,
“The Politics of British Commonwealth Air Training Plan Base Selection” (M.A. thesis,
Carleton University, 2000), 93-101; Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 225.
14 “The Call to Service,” Brantford Expositor, 3 September 1939, 4.
15 “Four Thousand Citizens Pledge Support to Empire,” Ibid., 4 September 1939, 6. On
Waterous’s military background, see Ibid, 23 December 1939, 23.
16 “Empire Air Training Scheme to Be Pushed,” Ibid, 1 Nov 39, 12; “Empire Air Training
Conference is Opened,” Ibid, 6 November 1939, 1; “From Deficits to Surplus,” Ibid, 22 Nov
1939, 4; Solidarity of the Empire,” Ibid, 19 December 1939, 3, 4. On Waterous’s “pay as you
go” fiscal policy and his balanced budgets, see also Gary Muir, Brantford: A City’s Century,
1895-2000 v. 1 (Brantford: Tupuna Press, 1999), 217.
17 See Heide, “Politics of BCATP,” 193, passim. On lobbying for BCATP bases, see also Brereton
Greenhous and Norman Hillmer, “The Impact of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan
on Western Canada: Some Saskatchewan Case Studies,” Journal of Canadian Studies 16/3&4
(Fall-Winter 1981), 133-44; and Peter C. Conrad, Training for Victory: The British
Commonwealth Air Training Plan in the West (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books,
1989), 14-22.
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knocking on Mayor Waterous’s office door.18 Brantford would be called upon
to play its part in the BCATP.  
Air authorities proposed to establish a Service Flying Training School
(SFTS) in the city.  For fledgling aviators just finished elementary training and
still unfamiliar with “high powered machines with variable-pitch propellers,
retractable undercarriages,” and more than a hundred technical instruments in
the cockpit, the learning curve at an SFTS was high and the room for error
large.  Therefore, before any final decision could be made, air officials needed
assurance that two relief aerodromes could be developed efficiently and eco-
nomically near the main base.  Local authorities conducted preliminary
investigations for a landing field at several locations, including a site on the Six
Nations of the Grand River reserve just seven miles southeast of Brantford.19
The Six Nations of the Grand River had the largest population of any
Indian community in Canada, numbering more than five thousand in 1940, and
their reserve, comprising seventy-two square miles, was the largest in eastern
Canada.  The rural homestead settlement pattern on the reserve, and its close
proximity to Brantford, made it attractive for a relief field.  More than one thou-
sand acres of cultivated fields and pasture land, covering five lots in Tuscarora
Township, met all of the preliminary criteria.  Transport officials found that the
approaches to the proposed sites were good, requiring the removal of only a
few trees and a few low buildings of the “inexpensive type belonging to the
Indians.”20
In typical fashion, the delegated authorities had begun their surveys with-
out informing either the Six Nations or Indian Affairs officials.  The Indian
superintendent21 at Brantford, Major E.P. Randle, had discovered the air force’s
interest while driving on the reserve in the course of his daily duties.  He came
across surveyors who explained that if a site on the reserve proved suitable he
would learn of it through “some other sources.”  Randle reflected that their
18 Muir, 238-9; “Formally Opens Brantford Civic Airport,” Brantford Expositor, 5 June 1930, 14;
Ibid, 8 November 1939, p.15. Although Waterous would neither confirm nor deny the RCAF’s
interest in Brantford at the time, it was obvious that they were discussing a BCATP facility.
19 Dunmore, Wings for Victory, 122-64; Airways Inspector to Controller Civil Aviation, DoT, 18
November 1939; Aerodrome Development Committee Minute No.19, n.d. (March 1940),
Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 12, v. 2328, f.5168-753, pt.1; Smart to McGill, 2
February 1940, LAC, RG 10, v.7755, f.27032-3, pt.1. An SFTS required two emergency land-
ing fields no closer than five miles and no more than twenty-five miles from each other or the
main aerodrome. Therefore, search parties trying to situate an SFTS “had to find clusters of
three aerodrome sites all satisfying the same technical specifications.” Heide, “Politics of
BCATP,” 116. 
20 V.I. Smart, Deputy Minister, DoT, to Dr. Harold W. McGill, Director, Indian Affairs Branch
(IAB), 2 February 1940, LAC, RG 10, v.7755, f.27032-3, pt.1.  On the Six Nations commu-
nity at the time, see A.A. Shimony, Conservatism Among the Iroquois at the Six Nations
Reserve (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1994), 18. 
21 At Brantford, the Indian superintendent performed the role of Indian agent.
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“attitude was courteous and their explanation appeared to be quite satisfactory
and reasonable to me,” and let them proceed because it brought no harm to any-
one and “might bring some benefits to the Indians.”  Several council members
and individual Indians also observed these activities and approached the
Randle, who assured them that Indian Affairs would place the matter before
them if the air force wanted the site.22
While Randle was in Ottawa in early 1940, however, local rumours began
to circulate that challenged his assurances to the community.  Six Nations “gos-
sip” suggested that the government planned to select the site on the reserve and
“did not have to either purchase or lease it, but could just take it over.”  The
threat of expropriation, even if a “somewhat absurd idea” in Randle’s view,
generated “a good deal of excitement and resentment.”23 Pre-emptively, a
group of residents quickly despatched a petition to Ottawa protesting an
“intended expropriation.”  Their plea highlighted the historical experiences and
patriotic efforts of the community, and recalled Sir Frederick Haldimand’s
“sacred treaty” promises to safeguard Six Nations rights for subsequent gener-
ations.  Already their land holdings along the Grand River had shrunk from
over a million acres to 49,000, and population increase had already caused a
local land shortage.  “Far be it for the Six Nations to hinder any plans of the
National Defence program,” they questioned, “but of the millions of acres of
land lying idle in the Dominion … why should it be found at all necessary to
seek additional [Indian reserve] land?”  If the government tried to take their
land without consent, it would be “contrary to the Indian sense of British fair
play and in direct contravention of the principles for which Canada and the
British Empire is now fighting for its life.”24
The Six Nations were already contributing patriotically to that war effort.
The community was “second to none” in its pursuit of war work, an impressive
number of men had enlisted in the armed forces, and the council had recently
donated $1,000 to the Red Cross.  Community women had created a Red Cross
unit, and individual Indian farmers had cultivated more acres during the previ-
ous season than ever before.  “In the present national emergency,” the 112
petition signatories asserted, “neither the lands nor the people of the Six
Nations are idle.”  There could be no accusations of disloyalty or complacency.
History “prove[d] that the loyalty of the Iroquois race … saved the day for
22 Major E.P. Randle, Indian Superintendent, Brantford, to McGill, 31 January 1940, LAC, RG
10, v.7755, f.27032-3, pt.1.
23 Ibid.
24 Miles Hill to MNR, Indian Affairs Branch (IAB), 12 January 1940, LAC, RG 10, v.7755,
f.27032-3, pt.1.  For a more detailed statement on Six Nations treaty rights and the Haldimand
Grant, see Six Nations, The Redman’s Appeal for Justice: The Position of the Six Nations that
they Constitute an Independent State (March 1924).
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Britain in Canada,” the letter stated, citing the past record of devoted Six
Nations service from the American Revolution to the Great War; this was suf-
ficient reason to uphold the treaties rather than having them “ruthlessly set
aside and regarded as ‘scraps of paper.’”26 Indeed, readers of the Brantford
Expositor had recently seen headlines touting the “Six Nations Loyalty Link
25 Map by Jennifer Arthur. Based on inside cover, C.M. Johnston, Brant County (Toronto, 1967)
and “Burtch Suggested Airport,” 20 November 1939, NAC, RG 10, v.7755, f.27032-3 pt.1.
26 Hill to IAB, 12 January 1940.  Some newspaper commentators had already drawn very simi-
lar conclusions.  See, for example, Charles Clay, “Indian Giving,” Winnipeg Free Press,
November 1939, in LAC, RG 10, v.6763, f.452-5, pt. 2. On Red Cross aid, see Minutes of
Special Six Nations Council meeting, 23 November 1939, LAC, RG 10, v.1755, f.63-32 pt.35.
On English Canadian media constructions of the Indian during the “Phoney War,” see R. Scott
Sheffield, The Red Man’s on the Warpath: The Image of the “Indian” and the Second World
War (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003), 62-71.  
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Welded in Wars: League of Iroquois Main Factor in Keeping Canada British,”
and boasting of the community’s patriotic contributions to date.27
The fusing of inviolable treaty rights to the Six Nations proud record of
military service through the Great War was central to the signatories’ concep-
tion of loyalty and patriotism.  About 300 men from the Grand River reserve
had served overseas during the earlier conflict; several earned notable distinc-
tion, and eighty-eight made the supreme sacrifice.  Voluntarism was one thing,
but prescribed loyalty was another.  Tensions had arisen over the issue of com-
pulsory military service, leaving a distasteful legacy.  The Six Nations regarded
themselves allies of the Crown, not subjects.  On the local level, Council vig-
orously protested the Soldier Settlement Act, defiantly arguing that the
government had no right to locate people on the reserve and fearing that it
would lead to an alienation of reserve lands.  Fred Loft, a Mohawk veteran of
the Great War, had cut his political teeth on the conscription debate and in the
interwar years his association, the League of the Indians of Canada, fought for
veterans’ rights, greater band control over properties and funds, and better edu-
cation standards.  It found many reasons for resentment, and after serving so
loyally during the war the inequitable treatment of Indian veterans left much to
be desired.28
Despite these difficulties, the continuing relationship between the Six
Nations and the military through the interwar years was not uniformly rooted
in the bitterness of broken promises and shattered dreams.  In 1930, Mohawk
27 H.M. Hill and Wm. Powless, “Six Nations Loyalty,” Brantford Expositor, 3 September 1939,
4; “Gift of $1,000 Voted By Six Nations Indians,” Ibid, 15 November 1939, 5; “Six Nations
Indians Form Red Cross Unit,” Ibid, 23 November 1939, 2.
28 James St. G. Walker, “Race and Recruitment in World War I: Enlistment of Visible Minorities
in the Canadian Expeditionary Force,” Canadian Historical Review 70 (1989), 9;  McGill to
F.L.C. Pereira, Assistant Secretary to the Governor General, 4 July 1940, LAC, RG 10, v.7755,
f.27032-3 pt.1; Scott Trevithick, “Conflicting Outlooks: The Background to the 1924
Deposing of the Six Nations Hereditary Council” (M.A. thesis, University of Calgary, 1998),
73-6, 85-9. On Six Nations opposition to conscription, see LCol R.H. Greer, District Military
Representative for Administration of Military Service Act, Military District No.2, Toronto, to
Secretary, Military Sub-Committee, M.S.A., Militia HQ, 15 November 1917; Captain A.R.
Minard to Greer, 13 November 1917, LAC, RG 24, v. 6566, f.HQ 1064-30-34 pt.1. For Loft’s
organized opposition in particular see Telegram, Gordon J. Smith, Brantford, to D.C. Scott, 13
November 1917, LAC, RG 10, v.6768, f.452-20 pt.1.  On the League of Indians, see Peter
Kulchyski, “‘A Considerable Unrest’: F.O. Loft and the League of Indians,” Native Studies
Review 4/1-2 (1988), 95-113; James Dempsey, Warriors of the King (Regina: Canadian Plains
Research Centre, 1999), 80-1, and E. Brian Titley, A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott
and the Administration of Indian Affairs in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1986), 102-9. On
the plight of Ontario Indian veterans, see RCAP, Looking Forward, Looking Back, 554-6;
Robin Brownlie, “Work Hard and Be Grateful: Native Soldier Settlers in Ontario after the First
World War,” in On the Case: Explorations in Social History eds. Franca Iacovetta and Wendy
Mitchinson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 181-203.
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veteran Oliver M. Martin became commander of the Haldimand Rifles, a long-
standing militia regiment with significant representation from Six Nations.
Martin was commissioned as a colonel when war broke out in 1939, and later
rose to brigade commander – the highest rank attained by a Canadian Indian.
Many others from Six Nations had joined Martin in volunteering for overseas
service when Canada declared war against Germany, and no one could deny
they had reaffirmed their alliance with the Crown.29 Correspondingly, the peti-
tioners demanded that the government reciprocate. 
The January 1940 petition encapsulated the legal and patriotic aspects of
the airfield opponents’ case, placing the onus on the federal government to
respond.  The Minister of Justice, in typical fashion, passed the petition to
Indian Affairs.  After all, a 1933 policy stipulated that Indians were not to con-
tact IAB headquarters directly – never mind another government department –
and were supposed to channel all disputes through their local Indian agent.30
The band members who opposed the airfield proposition refused to accept this
bureaucratic buck-passing and “beg[ged]” the justice minister to intercede on
their behalf, framing their appeal as a legal matter warranting immediate atten-
tion “for we are in danger of losing our homes by this Survey [, the land being]
the last of the Redman’s Heritage from our Creator.”  Their final comment jux-
taposed events at home with the tragedies abroad, saying “[s]urely this is not
going to be another Poland.”  Not only did the Six Nations people have a strong
sense of their land, historical relationship with the Crown, and legal rights, but
they also drew a compelling moral parallel between their collective security
and the ostensible purpose of the war itself.  In a war being waged over viola-
tions of international law and treaties, justice could not be denied to them
because their own “Covenant Chain” with Britain promised “Liberty, Peace and
Friendship.”31
At Indian Affairs headquarters, director Harold McGill pursued the tres-
passing complaints with the Department of National Defence (Naval/Air).  The
lack of information provided to either his field staff or the Indians had fed
rumours that the government intended to take over reserve land “without con-
sultation or … consent.”  The IAB was prepared to fully cooperate with military
authorities under wartime circumstances, but there was no excuse for taking
action without even the “courtesy of notification.”  This approach would actu-
29 Enos T. Montour, The Feathered U.E.L.’s (Toronto: United Church of Canada, 1973)131-34;
“Appointed to Command 4th Infantry Brigade,” Brantford Expositor, 28 November 1939, 6;
“Brigadier Oliver M. Martin,” Indian Missionary Record 11/4 (April 1948), 2. In the 1920s,
the Haldimand Rifles trained at a rifle range erected on a portion of the Mohawk Institute
grounds known as the “Glebe” site. See LAC, RG 10, v.3224, f.547,596.
30 Brownlie, “Man on the Spot,” 70.
31 “The Petitioners, Iroquois Confederacy, Grand River Lands,” to Hon. Mr. Laponte [sic],
Minister of Justice, LAC RG 10, v.7755, f.27032-3, pt.1. 
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ally delay the process and unduly burden Indian Affairs officials, he explained,
rather than expedite it.  While Indian reserves were technically Crown lands,
they were “not public lands.”  Therefore, the military needed permission before
proceeding with their plans.  “The Indians … naturally look to this Department
to protect their interests to the fullest extent,” McGill stressed, “and it is a mat-
ter of surprise to them that such action can be taken without first consulting
with them and obtaining the necessary consent.”32 If land leasing process was
respected, then there could be a quick resolution that was “entirely satisfactory
to both parties.”  It would be difficult to obtain the Indians’ requisite consent if
the military did not give “some preliminary consideration” to “their ownership
of these lands.”  McGill recommended that some form of consultative proce-
dure be established.33
Senior officials at the DoT and DND quickly apologized and formally
requested permission to proceed with their investigations.  Immediately, Indian
Affairs requested additional information so that the band council would be “in
a position to intelligently discuss the matter.”  Air officials insisted that they
always wanted to investigate potential sites with as little publicity as possible,
and IAB headquarters seemed to accept this explanation.  Locally, however,
Superintendent Randle began to question the wisdom of the airfield plan.  “A
large military training school on the Reserve might not in the long run be a
desirable thing,” he suggested to Ottawa.34
He seemed out of step with official plans that were taking shape.  By mid-
March, Transport agents had gone over the “Burtch” site in detail, found it
suitable, drew up leasing plans for wartime, and proposed to work out com-
pensation with “each individual owner”35 on the Reserve for annual rent and
loss of improvements.  The military arrangement was designed to be temporary,
and would not diminish the Reserve’s land base in perpetuity.  Nevertheless,
director McGill stressed that the band council should receive “a full explana-
tion,” and that “an appeal to their well known patriotism” might help to secure
their “consent and cooperation.”  After all, once the Air Force finalized their
32 DIA to Indian Superintendent, Brantford, 25 Jan 1940, Ibid; DIA to DM, DND(Naval/Air), 26
Jan 1940, LAC, RG 10, v.7615, f.13034-375, pt.2.
33 DIA to DM, DND(Naval/Air), 26 Jan 1940, LAC, RG 12, v. 2328, f.5168-753, pt.1; DIA to
Indian Superintendent, Brantford, 25 Jan 1940, LAC, RG 10, v.7755, f.27032-3, pt.1.  Early
wartime arrangements with the Squamish band for Kitsilano reserve lands in Vancouver were
held up as a best practice. See P.W. Lackenbauer, “Vanishing Indian, Vanishing Military:
Military Training and Aboriginal Lands in Twentieth Century Canada” (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Calgary, 2003), 158. 
34 Randle to McGill, 31 January 1940, ibid.
35 Although the reserve was owned by the Six Nations as a whole, individual landholders held
location tickets.  The implementation of this system of tenure, like much else, seemed to polit-
ically divide the Six Nations community.  Shimony, 19.
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plans they would expect to clear up the details with “the greatest possible
speed.”36
On 14 March 1940, the Six Nations Council discussed the airfield matter
at a special meeting.  Brantford mayor Reginald Waterous, an ardent promoter
of the training school who publicly stressed that “all matters must be sub-
servient to the war,”37 attended and placed his services at the federal
government’s disposal.  There were no military representatives in attendance,
so he found himself presenting the Air Force’s case.  He had his hands full.  The
council house was packed with excited band members, who peppered him with
questions.  Withdrawing to an adjoining room, Waterous and Randle’s deputy
(filling in for a sick superintendent) read McGill’s detailed letter to council sev-
eral times.  It generated a “considerable difference of opinion” amongst the
councillors, reinforcing the issue’s divisiveness.  The chief asked Waterous to
address the larger meeting, but the mayor wanted to hear some community dis-
cussion first.38
Those with strong objections to the airfield project dominated the conver-
sation.  William Smith, a former Six Nations councillor, read the petition he had
sent to Ottawa and explained his opposition at length.  Waterous tried to
“smooth away most of the objections raised” by explaining why the land was
needed, but pessimism remained.  Band councillors debated the various proce-
dures that should or should not have been taken regarding the site, and
lamented the lack of information they had been given.  Finally, council took an
impromptu poll of property owners to measure their opinion: five were in
favour, nine opposed, and two undecided.  Rather than face an unfavourable
decision, Waterous astutely asked council to postpone their vote until after an
Ottawa representative discussed “the exact arrangements” with individual
property owners.  Council agreed and the mayor effectively bought the federal
government time.  In a subsequent letter to DND, Waterous recommended
immediate action to secure the band’s consent:
During the course of the morning I gathered from the remarks made, that there
was a very definite feeling that the Indians would not receive fair treatment as
to price, terms, etc., this feeling being based on past experiences. In order to
36 McGill to Randle, 7 March 1940, LAC, RG 10, v.7755, f.27032-3, pt.1; McGill to Smart, 21
Feb 1940; Note to file, undated; Map of proposed layout, 6 March 1940; Superintending
Engineer, DoT, to C.A.W., DoT, 12 and 14 March 1940; Deputy Minister to Colonel K.S.
Maclachan, Acting Deputy Minister, DND (Naval and Air), 15 March 1940, LAC, RG 12,
v.2328, f.5168-753, pt.1.
37 Quote from “Duration of War May Prove Too Long, Mayor Says,” Hamilton Spectator, 27
October 1939.  In December 1939, Waterous was re-elected for the “wartime term.” Brantford
Expositor, 5 Dec 1939, 1.
38 “Memorandum Dictated … of a meeting of the Six Nation Council attended by R.J. Waterous,”
14 March 1940, Ibid.  
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overcome this feeling I think that the sooner a representative is sent here …
the better it will be. These are farm lands and it will not be easy for those who
vacate to secure other suitable lands on the Reserve. These should be got in
the very near future and at as early a date as possible.39
Federal authorities agreed, and the DoT quickly despatched Canadian National
Railways lands agent H.A. Palmer to meet with the Six Nations and negotiate
leases for the airport.40
The local Indian council did not wait for Palmer to arrive before reaching
its verdict.  On 4 April, William Smith raised the airfield issue at a band meet-
ing and the councillors voted 8-4 against its establishment.  This decision was
not based on “any feeling of disloyalty to the Crown,” their resolution
explained; the potentially affected locatees were all farmers and it would dis-
rupt their agricultural operations.  The airfield would be counter to their
interests – regardless of compensation.  Council did not feel this refusal would
be a major impediment to the war effort, repeating that in an area as large as
Ontario there had to be other equally suitable locations.  In Ottawa, director
McGill did not strike down the resolution, nor did he confirm his agreement.
Instead he sought more information.  “In the meantime,” McGill advised the
DoT in careful language, “such further action as may be considered advisable
in view of existing circumstances is … a matter for discussion and decision of
your Department.”41
Repeated failures to change the council’s opinion posed a problem in the
days ahead.  “After a perfectly fair, reasonable and friendly discussion,” local
superintendent Randle seemed prepared to take the Six Nations’ refusal as
final.42 In Ottawa, however, the Aerodrome Development Committee had
recently approved the selection and development of the site.  Its wartime
process was deliberately designed to acquire the best locations without local
political interference.  The Superintendent of Airways noted that because this
was Indian land it was neither necessary nor advisable to acquire it outright as
they were doing elsewhere, but even the leasing option seemed much more dif-
ficult than anyone had anticipated.  “It is evident that if you insist on an air field
at Burtch,” the chief land surveyor told the lease agent at Transport, “you must
deal with the Department of Indian Affairs and expropriate the land.  We can-
not do anything regarding obtaining leases from the Indians through their local
39 “Memorandum Dictated,” 14 March 1940; Minutes of Six Nations Council, 14 March 1940,
LAC, RG 10, v.1755, f.63-32 pt.35.
40 Randle to McGill, 15 March 1940; D.J. Allan, Superintendent Reserves and Trusts, IAB, to
McGill, 18 March 1940; Smart to McGill, 5 April 1940, LAC, RG 10, v.7755, f.27032-3 pt.1.
41 Randle to McGill, 11 April 1940, Ibid; Council Minutes, 4 April 1940, LAC, RG 10, v.1755,
f.63-32 pt.35; McGill to Smart, 9 April 1940, LAC, RG 12, v.2328, f.5168-753, pt.1.
42 Minutes of Special Council Meeting, 10 April 1940, resolution 31, LAC, RG 10, v.1755, f.63-
32 pt.35.
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Indian Agent.”  The Chief of Air Services asked the Department of Justice for
its opinion.  For his part, McGill, the Director of Indian Affairs, did not want to
be implicated in any expropriation, but asked to be advised on developments
which he could pass on to his local representative to discuss “intelligibly” with
the band.43 With rumours swirling, this seemed the most direct and reliable
way to keep the community informed of what was transpiring.
Anxiety at Six Nations grew as newspaper and radio reports proclaimed
Ottawa’s supposed plan to expropriate.  Readers and listeners were told that the
dozen Indian farmers directly affected all opposed the RCAF scheme, and their
Council backed them by “unanimous vote.”  This was an overstatement, but to
readers of national newspapers the band’s dissent must have seemed warranted.
Sympathetic articles highlighted the lack of government consultation, as well
as an Indian Affairs official’s explanation that “while hundreds of farms have
been surveyed in exactly this same way in the search for air sites, other farm-
ers do not live in the same dread of having their land taken from them as the
Indians do.”44 The Globe and Mail portrayed William Smith as “a Mohawk of
good education,” chosen by the affected families to act as their spokesman and
to present their case to Ottawa.  He spoke of treaty rights and loyalty, pro-
claiming that the Six Nations were “fighting for the same rights for which
Canada’s soldiers went overseas to fight.”  Convinced citizens wrote editorial
letters against the injustice of expropriating Indian lands.45
The Indian superintendent’s and newspaper reports suggested that the Six
Nations were solidly against the airport.  Brantford mayor Reginald Waterous
did not believe this captured the essence of what was transpiring locally, and he
sent a confidential letter to the director of aviation explaining that it was only a
“certain faction” of the band that continued to protest against the airport.  His
informants suggested that the group known as the “Mohawk Workers” had
instigated the fight, and they “seem[ed] to be against everything, particularly
the Government.”  Waterous also learned that about three dozen band members
had held a private meeting to discuss the issue, but only three of them were
landholders – at least one of whom was “distinctly in favor of the air-port.”
Furthermore, the committee they selected to go to Ottawa to protest consisted
of influential Six Nations sovereigntists Frank Miller, William Smith and
43 Chief Land Surveyor and Property Commissioner, Canadian National Railways, to Major C.J.
Isbester, Right of Way and Lease Agent, DoT, 12 April 1940 and 18 April 1940; C.P. Edwards,
Chief of Air Services (CAS), DoT, to Isbester, 18 April 1940; McGill to Smart, 18 April 1940;
Aerodrome Development Committee Meeting No. 19, n.d., LAC, RG 12, v.2328, f.5168-753,
pt.1.
44 Randle to McGill, 11 April 1940, LAC, RG 10, v.7755, f.27032-3 pt.1.
45 “Indians Withhold Land From R.C.A.F.,” Montreal Gazette, 15 April 1940, 16 April 1940;
“Indians Refuse to Rent Farms in Air Scheme,” Globe and Mail, 15 April 1940; “Indians
Voting Against Scheme,” Hamilton Spectator, 15 April 1940; Joan Huntley, “Objects to
Expropriation of Six Nations Lands,” Globe and Mail, 29 April 1940.
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Chauncey Garlow, none of whom owned property on the site.46 Obviously, the
picture that Waterous painted was not black and white, suggesting that this was
not simply a dichotomous case of the “Six Nations” opposing the “White gov-
ernment.”  Most of the opponents were not landowners.  Who was speaking for
the locatees that supported the airport?  More was transpiring behind the scenes
at Six Nations than federal officials realized.
Mayor Waterous recognized that historical divisions and internal band pol-
itics had a role in the current controversy, an appraisal that was strikingly
absent from the Indian superintendent’s assessments.  Factional divisions along
national, religious and political lines had always complicated Six Nations pol-
itics.  Internal cleavages within the Grand River community over the validity of
the “Traditional” hereditary versus the “Progressive” elective systems, for
example, extended back decades.  At the end of the nineteenth century, the
Progressive or Reformer (“Dehorner”) faction had petitioned Indian Affairs for
an elective council, reasoning that the Hereditary Chiefs were a “detriment to
the advancement of the nation” and were undemocratic.  Supporters of the
Hereditary system responded that the Six Nations were already progressing
under their traditional governance structure, and accused the proponents of an
elected system of being “half-breeds who were under the influence of local
Whites.”  Both sides questioned the legitimacy, authority, and voice of the
other.  Traditionalists who supported the Hereditary Chiefs maintained this line
well into the twentieth century, fearing that the election provisions of the Indian
Act would negate their treaty rights.47
The early interwar period brought the matter to a decisive point.  Chief
Deskeheh (Levi General), the leader of the Six Nations Hereditary Council,
adopted aggressive “hardline tactics” to push the Traditionalists’ sovereigntist
agenda.  In the early 1920s he deposed rival chiefs from council and fought
vociferously against Indian Affairs’ interference in local affairs.  Deskeheh and
his Traditionalist supporters took their Six Nations sovereignty fight – for an
acknowledgement of their national status as allies, not subjects – to the courts,
to Britain, and ultimately to the League of Nations in Geneva.  These bold
methods alienated some chiefs and community members, who organized into a
Loyalist Association in 1922 to “straighten out affairs on the reserve and get rid
of Levi General and his influence.”  Relations between the pro-Sovereigntist
Council and senior bureaucrats deteriorated further, and strident Council agita-
tion asserting special Six Nations nation-state status resulted in an impasse.
Amidst growing embarrassment nationally and internationally, the DIA aban-
46 Confidential letter, Reginald Waterous to Director of Aviation, DoT, 17 April 1940, LAC, RG
12, v.2328, f.5168-753, pt.1; Trevithick, “Conflicting Outlooks,” 81, 95.
47 Wayne Daugherty and Dennis Madill, “Indian Government Under Indian Act Legislation,
1868-1951” (Ottawa: THRC, DIAND, 1980), 46-50; John A. Noon, Law and the Government
of the Grand River Iroquois (New York: Viking Fund, 1949), 48-50, 64-5.
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doned its longstanding policy of neutrality and deposed the Traditional
Hereditary Council in 1924.48
The imposed elective system allowed Indian Affairs to reassert some con-
trol over the reserve.  Reform-minded “Loyalists” amongst the Six Nations, and
even government officials, acknowledged that a majority in the community
backed the Hereditary Council and harboured deep resentment towards the
Canadian government.  The “Mohawk Workers” – a political group committed
to Indian rights and the restoration of the Hereditary Chiefs and traditional form
of Six Nations self-governance – took shape, and continued to promote the con-
federacy in domestic and international venues wherever possible, emphasizing
Six Nations sovereignty and resisting any perceived threat to their remaining
political influence.  For their part, the Hereditary Longhouse Chiefs continued
to assert that they alone represented the legitimate voice of the people.49
Six Nations was a complex, politically factionalized community.  For his
part, Randle’s correspondence reflected his focus on the elected council.  In
mid-April he convened a special meeting to try to open up a more direct
approach to discern community opinions.  “After a prolonged discussion in a
somewhat excited atmosphere, with a good deal of bitter hostility only just held
under control,” Randle finally secured – by the narrowest of margins – a reso-
lution that authorized H.A. Palmer, the Transport representative, to interview
individual landholders.  This was a major concession, given the council’s pre-
viously adamant refusals.  Randle hoped that every property owner, “whether
for or against the landing field, would by these means have a fair opportunity
to judge better the value or the non-value of the proposition to him personally,
[rather] than in the heated atmosphere of the Council Chamber.”50 This was a
remarkably neutral tone, and carefully concealed his personal opinion on the
matter.
Palmer’s discussions with the residents allowed the federal government to
get a better sense of what was causing all of the local apprehensiveness.
Assisted by two Six Nations members, he encountered obvious “bitterness in
some cases.”  It was not the proposal per se, nor the air training program gen-
erally, nor a lack of patriotism that seemed to make locatees hesitant to lease
their lands.  “Really at the back of the unwillingness of the Indians to consent
to the landing field,” Randle explained, “is a belief that the suggestion is the
48 Trevithick, “Conflicting Outlooks,” 84, 95-106; Richard Veatch, Canada and the League of
Nations (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 91-100; Titley, A Narrow Vision, 110-
34.
49 Trevithick, “Conflicting Outlooks,” 84; Sally Weaver, “Health, Culture and Dilemma: A Study
of the Non-Conservative Iroquois, Six Nations Reserve, Ontario” (Ph.D. diss., University of
Toronto, 1967), 76-79, 91; Shimony, Conservatism Among the Iroquois; Noon, Law and the
Government, 61.
50 Special Council meeting report, Ohsweken, 18 April 1940; Randle to McGill, 29 April 1940,
LAC, RG 10, v.7755, f.27032-3 pt.1.
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thin edge of [a] wedge, and then finally though the property is only leased from
them, it will never be returned at the conclusion of the war.  Every effort has
been made by myself to allay these fears but they still persist.”  “Inopportune”
radio and newspaper announcements had created the impression amongst band
members that the field would be built on their lands with or without their con-
sent.  Some community members believed that Randle and Indian Affairs were
not acting in a frank and forthright manner.  In a sharp tone, Randle stressed to
his headquarters that lines of communication and “proper channels” were
essential.  “It is my belief,” he reiterated, “that if the situation is not irritated,
that finally we can win the voluntary relinquishment of the property by the
Indians, which I am sure the Department will agree is the most desirable way
of achieving what is required.”51
Unfortunately, for federal officials, local irritants were impossible to con-
tain.  In late April, seventeen different contractors trod over locatees’ lands in
response to a public call for tenders.  These violations occurred before Palmer’s
negotiations were completed, suggesting to locals that the government’s mind
had already been made up.  In response to the resulting fury, federal authorities
ordered the contractors to cease their inspections for the time being and
promptly recalled all of the airport plans.  They decided to change the layout to
avoid select farms and allow as many residents as possible to occupy their
buildings for the duration of the war, in hopes that this would “pacify” some of
the most “strenuous objectors.”  But too much damage had been done.52 The
general superintendent of Indian agencies, Martin Christianson, went to
Brantford to assist with negotiations, armed with the personal belief that “the
quieter we can keep the Indians the better for all concerned.”  Although he reas-
sured headquarters that satisfactory negotiations would obviate the need to
expropriate,53 the latter course seemed increasingly likely as time wore on.
On 3 May 1940, C.P. Edwards, the Chief of Air Services, documented that
Transport’s slow progress might necessitate “expropriation in order to get the
work started.”  A legal opinion from Indian Affairs supported this option.
McGill concluded that “if the Indians persist in their present attitude there is
51 Ibid; “Interviews Indians About Airport Site,” Ottawa Morning Citizen, 25 April 1940; “Indian
Land Sought: Ottawa Wants Air School on Six Nations Reserve,” Montreal Gazette, 25 April
1940.
52 Minutes of Council, 18 April 1940, LAC, RG 10, v.7755, f.27032-3 pt.1; Palmer to Edwards,
23 April 1940; Randle to McGill, 29 April 1940; Chief Land Surveyor, CNR, to
Superintendent of Airways, DoT, 29 April 1940; McGill to Edwards, 30 April 1940; Telegraph,
District Airway Engineer, Hamilton, to Civil Aviation, Ottawa, 30 April 1940; District
Inspector, Civil Aviation, Toronto, to Controller of Civil Aviation, DoT, LAC, RG 12, v.2328,
f.5168-753, pt.1; “Tries Coax Indians Permit Air School,” Edmonton Journal, 25 April 1940;
“Interview Indians Regarding Property,” Hamilton Spectator, 24 May 1940.
53 M. Christianson, General Superintendent of Agencies, to Randle, 1 May 1940; Edwards to
McGill, 3 May 1940, LAC, RG 12, v.2328, f.5168-753, pt.1.
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ample statutory authority to take over the area desired for war purposes,” refer-
ring to the Indian Act, Dominion Expropriation Act, and the War Measures
Act.54 Nevertheless, the final decision would await one last attempt to reach a
consensual agreement at Six Nations.  Palmer, Christianson and Randle were
closest to the front, and each believed that they could still obtain landholder and
council consent.  Based on agreements Palmer had reached with more than half
of the affected locatees – representing more than 60 percent of the land required
– he felt that there were still grounds for optimism.  Even the Indian Affairs
officials conceded that the rental terms were “generous in every shape and
form.”55
To the government’s chagrin, the Six Nations council on 8 May 1940 again
upheld their rejection by a narrow margin.  The final campaign to secure deci-
sive local consent to the landing field had failed on account of the “strong
minority” of property owners still opposed to it.  Palmer and Randle paid trib-
utes to one another and applauded the fairness of the consultative process, but
both acknowledged that any further efforts to negotiate with the Indians would
be futile.  “Apart from the property owners concerned, feeling ran high among
the Six Nations people of the Reserve in general,” the superintendent
explained, “and there was without question a good deal of bitter and open hos-
tility to the scheme leading to much controversy among themselves and much
mistrust and suspicion.”  Randle’s comments also showed an awareness of the
internal political pressures that council had to balance when determining their
own stand on the airfield question:
The members of the Council have all the way through the negotiations
behaved well, showing common sense and being fair and reasonable in their
arguments and courteous in every way to Mr. Palmer and myself. Nevertheless
they were in a most difficult position, assailed by the most bitter opponents
whom it is impossible to reason with, who carried with them a lot of those not
able to reason themselves. Consequently the Council in making their decision
were[,] in my opinion, conscientiously governed by what they felt in the long
run the best for good will and orderly progress among their own people on the
Reserve.
Palmer summed up their collective opinion when he stated that “everyone
agreed that it would be a mistake to attempt to force this project on the Six
54 W. Cory, Solicitor, Department of Mines and Resources (DMR) to McGill, 30 April 1940;
McGill to CAS, 1 May 1940; CAS to Mr. Matthews, 3 May 1940, LAC, RG 12, v.2328,
f.5168-753, pt.1.  
55 Confidential, Palmer to Colonel F.F. Clarke, DoT, Montreal, 4 May 1940; Chief Land
Surveyor and Property Commissioner to Superintendent of Airways, 6 May 1940, LAC, RG
12, v.2328, f.5168-753, pt.1; Randle, Superintendency Report for April 1940, 6 May 1940;
Randle to McGill, 9 May 1940, LAC, RG 10, v.7755, f.27032-3 pt.1.
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Nations Indians.”  They recommended that the government pack up its plans
for the airfield and take them elsewhere.56
Air authorities accepted this local advice and backed down from expropri-
ation.  On 14 May, the Deputy Minister of Transport informed National
Defence that negotiations had “completely broken down” and that it was “not
possible to expropriate the site and, in any case, it would be undesirable, due to
the present hostile attitude of the Indians.”57 There is no explanation why he
deemed it impossible to expropriate; previous Indian Affairs appraisals sug-
gested ample statutory authority, and internal DoT correspondence referred to
this possible course of action the previous week.  The real rationale seemed to
be an unwillingness to coerce the local Indians any further.  It would be the
Indians’ loss, internal correspondence asserted, with one marginal note cal-
lously commenting: “down the rat hole with them.”58
The Chief of Air Services “expected that there will be a change of heart
when [the Indians] discover that the field is going elsewhere, but the picture
will not change if the alternative is OK.”  In anticipation of a possible impasse
in negotiations with the Six Nations, Transport officials had hastily explored
alternate sites in early May.  Surveyors turned their attention to private property
southwest of Burtch Corners, which had been explored in a cursory manner the
previous fall.59 This confirmed earlier statements, voiced by Six Nations oppo-
nents, that other suitable plots of land existed in the region.  Indeed, the RCAF
changed its tune and concurred that this new site seemed preferable – it could
be purchased rather than leased, and then resold after the war.  The Aerodrome
Development Committee accepted this recommendation, after being reminded
that “the selection of a new site in place of that previously selected was origi-
nally made necessary through the Indians refusing to co-operate in the rental of
their lands.”60 All told, the local resistance had succeeded in denying the air
force the use of reserve lands. 
For that element within the Six Nations who resisted the airfield, the fed-
eral government’s unwillingness to use all of the available legal tools in its
56 Randle to McGill, 9 May 1940; Telegram, McLean to Controller of Civil Aviation, DoT, 8 May
1940; H.A. Palmer, Right of Way Agent, DoT, Toronto, to Clarke, 11 May 1940, LAC, RG 12,
v.2328, f.5168-753, pt.1; “Indians Vote Against Defence Dept. Plan,” Ottawa Citizen, 9 May
1940.  The actual results of the 8 May vote were not recorded.
57 Deputy Minister, DoT to Acting Assistant Deputy Minister (Air), DND, 14 May 1940, LAC,
RG 12, v.2328, f.5168-753, pt.1.
58 W. Ross MacDonald, M.P., Brantford, to CAS, 11 May 1940, and Marginalia, 14 May 1940,
LAC, RG 12, v.2328, f.5168-753, pt.1. 
59 Ibid; S.S. Foley, District Inspector, Southern Airways, Hamilton, to Controller of Civil
Aviation, DoT, 2 May 1940, 5 May 1940; reply, 3 May 1940; Superintendent of Airways to
Chief Land Surveyor and Property Commissioner, 10 May 1940, LAC, RG 12, v.2328, f.5168-
753, pt.1.
60 Aerodrome Development Committee Minutes, 4 July 1940, Ibid.
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wartime arsenal should have represented an undeniable victory.  Instead, local
protests continued to filter into Ottawa. “Whenever the Canadian Government
wants anything from our people, they take it, without any regards of honor,”
one petition asserted.  This conclusion seems peculiar in light of the govern-
ment’s decision, as was the petitioners’ characterization of Randle as a man
bent on “causing much trouble and disturbance among our People and ignoring
our sacred rights.” Understandably, the superintendent had no idea why these
individuals were still agitating when the proposal had been explicitly aban-
doned.61
Historical overviews often stress how federal officials exploited internal
divisions within Indian bands and used coercive “divide and conquer” tactics to
get their way.62 In this case, the government displayed no such inclination.  In
fact, some community members were thoroughly dismayed that the govern-
ment officials had sold out their interests to an unruly minority.  Resident Nettie
Doctor, writing on behalf of several landholders, sent a letter to the local mem-
ber of parliament immediately following the 8 May meeting.  She complained
that the council had voted against the scheme, despite the support of thirteen
landowners compared to only eight opposed.  The former held 496 acres, and
the latter group only 304 acres.  To her, this seemed very disproportionate.63
Doctor not only questioned the logic behind the council’s decision, but also
the character of those Six Nations members who resisted the plan.  “The peo-
ple who hold these 304 acres are not the least bit loyal,” she asserted.  Although
one woman would lose her home, there was “nothing sentimental” about her
opposition to the plan: it was “just a plain case of being bound to stop the air
field and thereby hinder the war effort.”  The letter writer’s frustration did not
end there.  “Bill Smith was again the chief speaker at the Council,” she
explained, but he was “neither a land owner nor a councillor.”  What right did
he have to represent the band’s interests?  Furthermore, she did not agree with
the local officials’ depiction of the meeting as a respectful affair.  Apparently,
Smith had viciously accused “the government men of bribery and dishonesty
[and] openly insulted Mr Palmer and Major Randle.”  Her point was clear:
Are you as a government going to let these people rule here or are you going
to show them that they must obey the law and help bring about an end to the
61 Similarly, William Smith continued to actively oppose the government’s plans.  See Hill to
their Majesties, 28 April 1940; “In the Great Spirit We Trust,” Cayuga Longhouse, 4 May
1940; W.J.F. Pratt, Private Secretary to Minister, to Deputy Minister, DMR, 17 May 1940;
William Smith to William Lyon Mackenzie King, 17 May 1940; Hill to Crerar, Minister of
DMR, 20 May 1940; McGill to Pereira, 10 June 1940; Randle to Secretary, IAB, 20 June 1940,
LAC, RG 10, v.7755, f.27032-3 pt.1.
62 See, for example, Brownlie, “Man on the Spot,” 67.
63 Nettie V. Doctor, Hagersville, to W. Ross MacDonald, 8 May 1940, LAC, RG 12, v.2328,
f.5168-753, pt.1.  
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present war[?] If they are allowed to triumph in this thing they will sneer more
than ever at the Canadian Government.  They (the agitators) claim that you
can’t expropriate and dare not make any arrests.64
The government’s reputation seemed to be at stake.  The official decision not
to proceed with expropriation, following her logic, would lead to disorder and
undermine government credibility locally.  
Isaac Doctor, a Mohawk veteran of the Great War who “maybe [felt] things
a little more keenly than non-combatants,” believed that the government’s deci-
sion to go elsewhere was anything but a victory for “loyal” community
members.  His impassioned letter of 30 May 1940 explained to the federal air
minister that the Six Nations reserve was perpetually divided between two rival
factions: the “Loyalists” who maintained an allegiance to the Crown and to
Canada, and the “Mohawk Workers” who followed “the old hereditary chiefs
and do not think we belong to Canada or should have anything to do with the
Canadian Government.”  Most residents had been willing to lease their lands
for the war effort, Doctor asserted.  The others had fallen victim to lies circu-
lated by the “subversive” Mohawk Workers led by “traitor” William Smith, and
were “made [to] believe that someone wants to put something over on them.”
Unfortunately, no one connected with the military had visited the reserve to dis-
abuse them of this notion.65
Doctor’s reflective message was not that the government had been overly
imposing, but that the majority of landholders had been sold down the river by
negligent Indian Affairs officials who backed down too easily.  When the elected
band council decided against the establishment of an airport at the 8 May meet-
ing, the “self-serving and unpatriotic” spokesman of the Mohawk Workers
made the meeting a raucous affair. “Outside influence and bribery” accounted
for the negative outcome of the vote, Doctor asserted, and supporters of the air-
field had not intervened because they believed the superintendent and inspector
“would take the talk for what it was worth and stand by those who were loyal.”
Doctor and other “Loyalists” visited superintendent Randle to “see what could
be done.”  He had advised them to keep a low profile “until the excitement
abated” and to let developments take their course.  They had followed his rec-
ommendation, knowing that Indian Affairs headquarters could refuse to
sanction the resolution.  “We thought [Randle] intended to stick by those who
are loyal and believe in him and the Govt,” Doctor explained.  When later they
had looked into the matter, they were profoundly disappointed:
64 Ibid. For a newspaper perspectives citing “sentimental reasons,” see “Indians Reject Air Plan,”
Montreal Gazette, 9 May 1940, and “Indians Spurn Proposal for Air School on Reserve,”
Edmonton Journal, 9 May 1940.  
65 Isaac Doctor to Hon. C.G. Powers [sic], 30 May 1940, LAC, RG 12, v.2328, f.5168-753 pt.1.
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He told us that it was “all off” at his recommendation. He said that he asked
the Indian Dept. to let it go. The Mohawks Workers say that he was afraid to
go ahead with it. One of our neighbours says Major Randle told him before
Christmas that there would be no Airport here as he would not sanction it.  It
looks as if he is working for the subversive element … instead of those who
are loyal and wish to help their country.
I called on some of the Councillors who voted against it and two of them
said that if they thought Canada wanted the field they were more than willing
to vote for it. Another one, who is a [Company Sergeant-Major] in the
Dufferin Haldemads [sic] Rifles said that since the recent turn of events in
Europe he wondered if they had done right.66
At a time when newspapers documented German armoured columns
streaming through the Low Countries and into France, the lack of guidance and
confusion prevented the majority of landholders – willing to lease their land –
from “doing their bit.”  The Six Nations had “always [been] ready to serve their
King in time of need,” Doctor reflected, and they would “be very sorry that they
turned this chance down when they realize that the country really needed this
property.”  From his perspective, the decision to back down on the airfield plan
was a big mistake.  “Please help us to help the Six Nations people to again be
proud of themselves and stand on the right side,” he pleaded.  Abandoning the
Loyalist cause and pandering to the forces of disloyalty would “hinder recruit-
ing and all patriotism on this Reservation,” Doctor warned, and if the
government did not support the Loyalists they would no longer “find it pleas-
ant to live here.” His appeal ended with a flourish that reinforced his strong
sense of history and resolve for justice.  He had been asked “by the loyal land
owners to write this letter as a last stand as we feel … that like Leopold of the
Belgi[an]s, Major Randle, as our agent, deserted us in our hour of need.”67
Isaac Doctor’s letter outlined a self-described “Loyalist” perspective on
what had transpired at Six Nations.  The government’s unwillingness to act
decisively to acquire the airfield site revealed not only the perceived – and self-
imposed – limits to federal power and resolve, but a tangled web of
relationships and divisions.  It would be easy to misrepresent the opposition
encountered at Six Nations as the clear opinion of a besieged and unified com-
munity – the portrait painted by the hereditary council and “Mohawk Workers”
– that triumphed over the bellicose wishes of the wartime establishment.  While
this would be a compelling picture of successful Indian agency and the carriage
of justice, it would also belie alternative views within the community.
Superintendent Randle repeatedly placed the proposal before the Six Nations,
so he could be characterized by some as an instrument of government coercion
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
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and oppression.  To others, he was overly compliant to the alleged voices of dis-
loyalty.  
Perhaps Randle’s approach represented an appropriate response to coun-
tervailing pressures, in which he ultimately convinced the military to take its
plans elsewhere in the face of a divisive local debate.  In essence, all of these
conflicting appraisals could be sustained based on selective readings of the
archival record.  Certainly Randle was not the “quintessential organizational
man” described by Noel Dyck; he did not uniformly throw his weight behind
the government’s plans.  His engagement on behalf of the community, while
careful and subdued, carried influence in Ottawa.  Although Randle was a “mil-
itary man” (all the superintendents at Six Nations from 1907-52 had military
backgrounds),68 he did not uncritically genuflect before the altar of wartime
sacrifice and categorically dismiss local Indian concerns.  In the months and
years ahead, he went on to display similar support when the Six Nations faced
the divisive issue of conscription.69 His ambiguous approach to local gover-
nance issues seemed well suited to the delicate situation at Six Nations, and as
the circumstances of the war shifted he – like the band – adapted. 
Already the world seemed a very different place by late June 1940.
Hitler’s forces had conquered Northwest Europe in six short weeks.  Canadians
were shocked and dismayed at the realization that Britain and the
Commonwealth stood alone to face the Axis powers.  This revelation hit home
in communities all across Canada, including the Six Nations reserve.  On 20
June, the elected band council reversed their previous decision by a narrow
margin and passed a new resolution expressing their willingness to lease the
airfield “in view of the gravity of the situation facing this country and the
Empire.”  This offer was not accepted – Transport had feverishly prepared plans
for the new site and was not going to reverse its decision again – but the Six
Nations’ gesture demonstrated a discernible shift in local opinion.70
Canada’s “limited liability” war effort was jettisoned that summer, the
BCATP thrown into overdrive, and conscription for domestic service intro-
68 For the depictions of the quintessential Indian agent, see Dyck, What Is the Indian ‘Problem’?,
77 and Brownlie, “A Fatherly Eye,” 30, 35.
69 See, for example, LAC, RG 10, v.6769, f.452-20 pt.6; R.S. Sheffield, “‘In the Same Manner
as Other People…’: Government Policy and the Military Service of Canada’s First Nations
People, 1939-1945” (M.A. thesis, University of Victoria, 1995), 94-5, 105.
70 Minutes of special meeting, 20 June 1940; Randle to George E. Wood, M.P., 20 June 1940,
LAC, RG 10, v.7755, f.27032-3 pt.1; “Indians Reverse Airfield Vote,” Toronto Star, 20 June
1940; “Indian Council Favors Airfield,” Brantford Expositor, 20 June 1940; “Indians Favor
Airport,” Globe and Mail, 21 June 1940; and “Indians Permit Airfield at Last,” Edmonton
Journal, 21 June 1940. William Smith immediately petitioned to organize a delegation that
would visit the prime minister and governor general before anything could go forward.  Smith
to King, 24 June 1940; Smith to Earl of Athlone, 25 June 1940, LAC, RG 10, v.7755, f.27032-
3 pt.1.
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duced.  Compulsory military service caused serious concerns in Aboriginal com-
munities across the country, but most remained committed to winning the war.71
At Six Nations, for example, the elected council “cheerfully and readily” leased
part of its Glebe property in mid-1940 for an army mobilization and training
camp.  The nominal rent meant foregoing several hundred dollars in annual
commercial rent and suggested a newfound spirit of cooperation with military
authorities.72 Indeed, local men and women continued to enlist in high numbers
and the community’s patriotic contributions drew significant media attention.73
After the fall of France, strategic bombing seemed the only short-term
strategy to prosecute offensive action, and bombing training became a BCATP
mainstay.  No. 5 Service Flying Training School (SFTS) opened in Brantford
on 11 November 1940, and began to churn out graduates.  By the fall of 1941,
the scope of training demanded a practice bombing range to serve the school
and No. 16 SFTS in Hagersville.74 Despite the earlier failure to secure an air-
field at Six Nations, air authorities again approached Indian Affairs about a
potential lease of reserve lands that October.  When surveyed by air, two alter-
native sites proved unsuitable and a seven hundred acre tract on the reserve
seemed the best area for a range in the vicinity.75
This time, Superintendent Randle encountered little resistance when he
placed the matter before the elected Six Nations council.  Their relationship
with the air force had evidently warmed.  For example, earlier that year the
Mohawks had made Group Captain B.F. Johnson, the commanding officer of
No. 5 SFTS, honorary chief “Da-Ha-Daha” (“One Who Flies”),76 and they had
71 See Michael D. Stevenson, Canada’s Greatest Wartime Muddle: National Selective Service and
the Mobilization of Human Resources during World War II (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 2001), 37-50; Stevenson, “The Mobilisation of Native Canadians During the Second World
War,” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association (1996), 205-226; Scott Sheffield and H.
Foster, “Fighting the King’s War: Harris Smallfence, Verbal Treaty Promises and the Conscription
of Indian Men, 1944,” UBC Law Review 33:1 (1999), 53-74; Hugh Shewell, “Jules Sioui and
Indian Political Radicalism in Canada, 1943-1944,” Journal of Canadian Studies 34/3 (Fall 1999),
211-41; Sheffield, Red Man’s on the Warpath, 71-84. For a telling local testimony, see William F.
Powless, “Indian Viewpoint,” Hamilton Spectator, 17 July 1943.
72 LAC, RG 10, v.6829, f.503-8-2 pt.1; Memorandum of Agreement, 20 January 1941, Indian
and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC), Indian Lands Registry (ILR) instrument X17474;
“Military Training Centre on Glebe Property,” Brantford Expositor, 13 August 1940.
73 See, for example, “Six Nations Indians With the Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles,” Brantford
Expositor, 4 January 1941; “Reveal Indians Most Generous,” Hamilton Spectator, 31
December 1941; “Six Nations Indians Serve Loyally in Canada’s Forces,” Ibid, 26 June 1942;
74 F.D. Van Luven, “Date Seen Significant For Air School Opening,” Globe and Mail, 12
November 1940. For basic overviews of these schools, see Paul Ozorak, Abandoned Military
Installations v. 1 (n.p.: self-published, 1991), 23-4, 90-1. 
75 See correspondence on LAC, RG 10, v.7755, f.27032-3 pt.1.
76 “Group Captain Johnson to be an Indian Chief,” Brantford Expositor, 16 May 1941; “Colorful
Ceremony at Air Training School as Indians Confer Names,” ibid, 21 May 1941; MacInnes to
Randle, 7 October 1941, LAC, RG 10, v.7755, f.27032-3 pt.1.
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77 Map by Jennifer Arthur. Based on DoT, Air Services Branch, “Plan of Property Required for
Mount Hope Target,” 16 December 1941, INAC, ILR instrument X17478.
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Figure 2: Proposed Bombing Range at Six Nations77
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already reversed their opposition to military activities on their lands with the
change in wartime context.  The Six Nations of the Grand River now seemed
to confirm their avowed support.  
So long as the locatees agreed to air force leasing arrangements, Six
Nations council was amenable to these plans.  Randle met with the individual
landholders at a public meeting that month, and with “very little discussion or
discord” arrived at a tentative agreement with nineteen farmers in Oneida
Township.  Before the end of October 1941, Transport acquired options from
each of the residents agreeing to lease their lands.78 The elected Six Nations
council still wanted to maintain a formal say in the matter and asked to sign a
general agreement consenting to the wartime leases.  This was irregular, but
considering their goodwill Randle felt that this request was more than reason-
able.  He asked that the Branch consider the council’s position “as a little
honour and dignity conferred would help greatly.”  On 21 November, council
passed a resolution approving the agreements reached with the respective
“owners,” and declined when asked if it wanted any of the compensation 
paid into the general trust funds.79 The arrangements had been reached in
remarkably short order, and to the apparent satisfaction of everyone directly
involved. 
Despite explicit landholder agreements regarding the range and the elected
council’s clear consent, some supporters of the Hereditary Council convened a
separate meeting and passed resolutions against an air force presence.  Following
the same lines of argument they had used to oppose the airfield the previous year,
speaker Chauncey Garlow wrote to the Governor General in late 1941 protesting
“any sort of Military training on our Domain,” contending that because the land
was held in common no single individual could consent to its alienation.
Although the petition again called on the Crown to intervene as “the pledged 
protector of our people,” Indian Affairs assured the Queen’s representative 
that Garlow had no connection with the elected band council and was merely 
a member of a group “opposed to all supervision by the Government of
Canada” whose recent activities had “bordered on the subversive.”  The elected
78 Randle to Secretary, IAB, 15 October 1941; Yates to McGill, 31 October 1941; Randle, 3
November 1941; MacInnes to Randle, 15 November 1941, ibid.  Transport authorities obtained
three more options in early November, augmenting the range area an additional 87.5 acres.
Waterous was not involved in these negotiations, having resigned as mayor in September 1940
to serve as Director of Material Resources in the National War Services Department.
“Brantford Mayor Appointed to Important Wart-Time Post,” Hamilton Spectator, 26
September 1940.
79 Randle to Secretary, IAB, 3 November 1941, 21 November 1941; Allan to Chief Treasury
Officer, 18 December 1941; McGill to Randle, 19 December 1941, LAC, RG 10, v.7755,
f.27032-3 pt.1; PC 9923, 19 December 1941, INAC, ILR instrument X17476. 
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council had already agreed to a lease and therefore the matter was a fait 
accompli.80
At this point in the war, Indian Affairs would no longer entertain dissent-
ing political opinions from the Hereditary Council in the face of clear
landholder and elected council consent.  After all, in his notes the local Indian
superintendent observed contentment, not dissent, at Six Nations.  The final
arrangements were put in place without incident and Randle recorded that the
“Indian land owners concerned [were] well satisfied with the compensation and
rental they received.”  In early 1942, about sixty Indians found employment
clearing timber off the practice range, and the BCATP schools in the area began
to use the range for training operations soon thereafter.81 Minor issues would
arise from time to time that frustrated band members, but no voices or devel-
opments questioned or jeopardized the air force’s use of the lands.
* * *
The same event can serve as a different kind of element of many different his-
torical stories, depending on the role it is assigned in a specific motific
characterization of the set to which it belongs … In chronicle, this event is
simply “there” as an element of a series; it does not “function” as a story ele-
ment.  The historian arranges the events in the chronicle into a hierarchy of
significance by assigning events different functions as story elements in such
80 Chief Chauncey Garlow, Speaker, Six Nations Council, Onondaga Long House, to Governor
General of Canada, 27 December 1941; MacInnes to Pereira, Asst Secretary to the Gov. Gen.,
16 January 1942; T.R.L. MacInnes, Secretary, IAB, to Randle, 20 January 1942, LAC, RG 10,
v.7755, f.27032-3 pt.1.  In his earlier letter, Doctor expressed concern that a “fifth column”
might emerge, and noted that some of Smith’s adherents already refused to stand at attention
when “God Save the King” was sung.  After the government decided to take their airfield else-
where, Smith and some of his “associates” were indeed suspected of trying to make a radio
broadcast from Buffalo to draw attention to their alleged mistreatment over the airport ques-
tion.  Apparently, they had “openly stated” that they intended their message to reach Berlin.  In
light of the known Nazi propaganda attacks on North American Indian administration, crafted
to stimulate sympathy amongst the Indians, this allegation was not insignificant.  Smith to
King, 24 June 1940; Smith to Earl of Athlone, 25 June 1940; McGill to Randle, 28 June 1940;
MacInnes to Randle, 12 July 1940; McGill to Sir Shuldham Redfern, Secretary to Governor
General, 18 July 1940, LAC, RG 10, v.7755, f.27032-3 pt.1.  On alleged subversion in North
America see Sheffield, Red Man’s on the Warpath, 71-73; Kenneth Townsend, World War II
and the American Indian (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000), 33-60 and
Jeré Bishop Franco, Crossing the Pond: The Native American Effort in World War II (Denton,
TX: University of North Texas Press, 1999), 12-33.
81 Six Nations Superintendency Monthly Report, 17 February 1942; E. Burns, Treasury Office,
IAB to Mr. McCrimmon, 16 October 1942; G.W. Yates, Assistant Deputy Minister, DoT, to C.
Camsell, Deputy Minister, DMR, 20 October 1942, LAC, RG 10, v.7755, f.27032-3 pt.1.
Lease no.33993, 25 November 1942, INAC, ILR instrument X17513. It was not until late 1942
that an official lease was executed in Ottawa, but this was an administrative delay rather than
a functional one and had little bearing on actual operations. The official lease was for 869.1
acres.
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a way as to disclose the formal coherence of a whole set of events considered
as a comprehensible process with a discernible beginning, middle, and end.82
Hayden White’s reflections on history as narrative help to situate the pre-
ceding story in historiographical context.  Before historians can mobilize their
historical evidence, they “must first prefigure the field,” White suggests, “as a
ground inhabited by discernible figures.”83 The subsequent transformation of
chronicle into story demands the suppression of “non-events” that do not fit
with the author’s mode of emplotment, their choice of argument, and the ideo-
logical purpose or function of the story they are telling.
After a careful reading of the documentary record, the preceding case study
suggests that the RCAP’s victimization narrative is misleading.  It neglects to
mention that a Six Nations faction successfully opposed a government proposal
to use reserve lands for an airfield, and convinced federal officials to abandon
a chosen site.  Internal band dynamics, the form and nature of opposition, and
the government’s decision to back down rather than expropriate, revealed that
the military’s will did not always prevail.  Six Nations opposition was complex
and layered.  Therefore, the RCAP applied a highly selective and reductionist
transformation of the documentary evidence to sustain its usefulness in a Tragic
emplotment. 
Perhaps most disconcerting, given the prevailing historiography, are mar-
ginalized voices such as those of the Six Nations “Loyalists” – local
government supporters – present in the archival record.  It is striking that
Randle never documented their conversations in his correspondence with head-
quarters.  The Indian superintendent and other federal officials devoted time
and energy to explaining the rationale of those who opposed the airfield, but
concealed assurances they gave to local stakeholders who supported the mili-
tary’s plans.  The complexity that the Doctors’ letters suggest, however, should
not be summarily discarded simply because it complicates the Tragic narrative.  
For “Loyalist” community members, the government’s acquiescence to
local critics seemed an incredible injustice that pandered to forces of disloyalty
on the reserve and represented an abhorrent display of weakness.  If the “polit-
ical agenda” of Indian agents “was shaped by their personal interest in
maintaining Departmental control over the reserves,” as Brownlie generalized,
then Randle’s actions seem strangely anomalous.84 Superintendent Randle did
not throw his full weight behind the planned airfield, despite it being a clear pri-
ority of the federal government.  Rather than coercing the elected council to
consent, Randle questioned the plans themselves and appeared sympathetic to
82 White, Metahistory, 7.
83 Ibid, 5, 30.
84 Brownlie, “Man on the Spot,” 85.
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the position asserted by anti-government “Mohawk Workers.”  During the
heated debate, one of the most vociferous critics of the scheme accused the
superintendent of being duplicitous.  Based on the outcome, it appeared that on-
reserve supporters of the airfield actually had the more compelling argument in
this respect.  
Written correspondence by some members of the Six Nations community
suggested that Randle was co-opted by disloyal local elements, and that the
superintendent himself was subverting government control.  On a politically
divided reserve, however, government officials seemed caught in an impossible
position.  There is no single “Six Nations” voice for the careful observer to rely
upon without privileging one local Native perspective over another.  And it
would be inherently problematic and patronizingly selective to denigrate the
voices of those band members who supported a lease by suggesting that they
were less “Indian” than those who opposed it, simply by virtue of their will-
ingness to support what they perceived to be a legitimate wartime request.85
The RCAP report’s brief description of Six Nations lands serves its broader
emplotment of Tragedy.  The situation is explored and useful only to the extent
that it highlights the mechanistic process of pernicious bureaucrats stealing
Indian lands.  The statement is simple and apparently unambiguous: “In many
cases, even a lease was opposed by the band council involved. At Six Nations,
for instance, there was a great deal of opposition to the lease of land for a prac-
tice bombing range.”  Devoid of context, extricated from internal debates, and
situated in a teleology of oppression, this simple appraisal serves to highlight
ongoing government perfidy and the need for contemporary restitution and
restructured relationships.  
The history of Six Nations-military relations over the use of lands for air
training might be better cast within the trope of Satire/Irony.  A contextualist
position prioritizes context: why events occurred is best explained “by the rev-
elation of the specific relationships they bore to other events occurring in their
circumambient historical space.”  The threads that linked the opposition at Six
Nations need to be traced outward, rather than reduced or cut off.86 Ironic
satire challenges the idea that a single anecdote can adequately represent the
whole and predicts a liberal rather than a radical ideology, seeing more com-
plexity in past relationships.  Cast in an Ironic tone, this case study challenges
assumed “laws” in the historiography pertaining to Indian agent behaviour and
85 Scholars like Lisa Tuhiwai Smith might say that these “Loyalist” individuals suffered from a
colonized mindset, and thus can be safely ignored or pitied. See, for example, Decolonizing
Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (London: Zed, 1999).  This attribution of
“false consciousness” is limited as an intellectual tool, however, due to its inherently tauto-
logical nature – it cannot be “proved” or “disproved” on the basis of evidence, and thus must
exist as assertion.  
86 White, Metahistory, 17-8.
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government coercion.  Refusing to “provide the kinds of formal coherencies
one is conditioned to expect from reading Romance, Comedy, and Tragedy,”87
it does not proclaim any certain answers.  It does, however, raise implicit ques-
tions about assumptions in the prevailing meta-narrative.
A rigid methodological and theoretical framework built solely around
agency and resistance to hegemonic actors and structures, narrated as Tragedy,
denies complexity and marginalizes aspects of negotiation, compromise, and
accommodation.  Tragic histories that focus on exposing repressive strategies
and practices thus share with most “postmodern” histories a tendency to melt
all evidence and plots into a Marxist or leftist-Hegelian narrative.88 A frame-
work predicated on binary ethnic dichotomies that contrast “Aboriginal and
non-Aboriginal culture, values, and lifestyles,” political scientist Alan Cairns
explained, “puts the two sets of people into separate camps, and normally
accords the moral high ground to Aboriginal peoples.”  By simply reversing the
old Euro-Canadian rhetorical reliance on “good and bad,” however, the domi-
nant narrative of Aboriginal-government relations minimizes points of
convergence and inhibits appreciation of the “multiplicity of aspirations … that
exist within Native society.”89 In this light, the Tragic form seems Ironic
indeed.
87 Ibid, 28.
88 F. Jameson, The Political Unconscious cited in Elizabeth Churchill, “Tsuu T’ina: A History of
a First Nation’s Community, 1890-1940” (Ph.D. diss., University of Calgary, 2000), 550 en.13. 
89 Alan Cairns, Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2000), 60, 98-99.  Cairns takes the latter quote from John Borrows, “Negotiating
Treaties and Land Claims: The Impact of Diversity Within First Nations Property Interests,”
The Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 12 (1992), 233. For a more theoretical articulation
of this point, see Ortner, “Resistance and Ethnographic Refusal.”
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